“The general feeling of the cabinet was that the withdrawal of India should not be imposed by our weakness, nor should it be the first step towards the dissolution of the Empire. On the contrary, this action must prove to be a logical conclusion that we have welcomed, a policy pursued by successive governments for many years. It was too late to reverse the whole direction of our Indian policy, even if we had the desire to do so, and there was no reason to fear the particular repercussions of the completion of this policy. Our main objective now was to get the major Indian communities to cooperate so that there would be a properly representative authority to which we could give power. If the Viceroy was correct in his estimate that we should not be able to govern India effectively beyond the first part of 1948, and if the announcement of our intention to leave India at some point could lead to a consolidation of communities, it would be good if we were informed of the early announcement of measures. that we could take advantage of. indeed, be inevitable. Thus, the Indian army developed as an army of mercenaries in the interest of imperialist power, totally cut off from the mainstream of the people, without national objectives, and deliberately kept away from the political environment. It is an army like this that the Indian government received as a legacy of the British. After August 15, 1947, the Indian army, alongside its anti-national heritage, was placed for two years under the supreme command of General Boucher, British commander-in-chief. Our training in defence services continued to be in the hands of the imperialists, as was the case at Defence Services Staff College in Wellington, where in October 1950 “the commander, General W.D.A.
Lontaigne, entered the main conference room, interrupted the speaker and denounced our leaders for their short-sightedness and inaction in the face of Chinese action” … But imagine our astonishment when Mountbatten told us that the two new nations now wanted to remain in the Commonwealth, provided that their independence could be accelerated. He pointed out that Jinnah had always wanted Pakistan to become a Dominion in the Commonwealth and that Congress, which understood that it would disadvantage it, had applied for a similar constitutional status, provided that the transfer could take place earlier than June 1948. Nehru also considered Dominion status to be transitory, which could lead to Indian unity. Lord Mountbatten (who served from March to August 1947) was sent to replace Wavell as viceroy, with Britain ready to transfer its power over India to a few “responsible” hands by June 1948. Shortly after reaching Delhi, where he met with the leaders of all parties and with his own officials, Mountbatten decided that the situation was too dangerous to wait, if only for this short period. Fearing a forced evacuation of British troops still stationed in India, Mountbatten decided to opt for a partition that would divide Punjab and Bengal, instead of risking further political negotiations as a civil war raged and a new mutiny of Indian troops was imminent. Among India`s leading leaders, Gandhi alone refused to reconcile with partition and asked Mountbatten to offer Jinnah the post of prime minister of a united Indian nation instead of a separate Muslim nation.